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This matter is before the court upon appellee's motion, 
filed December 30, 2002, to allow filing of an over-length brief. 
Appellant did not object or otherwise respond to the motion. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellee's motion to allow filing 
of an over-length brief of 34 pages is granted. Appellee's brief 
is hereby accepted for filing and is deemed filed as of the date 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
T i n ' i 'i MI n i l l i e i in i in i s « h i ! i I HI i t r i r l i u • J I U * t I in i •. < \\>\ K . ' . - I 1 p i J i b i K J i i I l 
I I" Mil"! i .itie Annotated §78-2a-3(2) (h) . 
STATEMENT" OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
mhr primary issues raised by the Appellant:, on rh.is appea,... are 
! f:r factum tindinqs f^ f r he *' l- ial rv--r*- -j--.-,- Court f-i^ '-i t. :.,-»• 
ci- -r • - - . . . ...-» v.. ' s asseis urom a 
prior marriage were premarital property. Appellair con:end^ vhat 
becaui-e po*":: ion? ^f ?-hat 14 ' -^es were sold off uj - l -is 
*\ :•-•-! proceea.
 fc rom approximately mtee ^na ^ .-
he-If acres v/ere usea * o help support t h« • family ai i because an 
aborted fe* t- of Mr - -u :<-
property,
 4r
 +
 ,.s property has lost u.s separate icier: .  t\ */i 
thereby shouid have been considered • • >e marit a 1 nroperty. 
Appel .-.. amj.e ha. ,a:.d, contends siitr - ontributed so 
substantially to its increase in value that she was entitled to 
Tl: le determination by the trial .\v.-r-1. ;:hal thlr was premarital 
property permeates all >^f App^ • lant ' °- a»qumenrr* ^f- :inoen". This 
" - - - - : : . ;.e 
c o m ' :* a i v j s i u n o i n:di i t d J p r o p e r t y was i n e q u i t a b l e . 
. r r ^ h e r - o n t e . r • une f a c t u a l i m c -* 
. i . . . . . ... .acome was $4 0<°>n r.. . . : ontJ i . 
1 
AppeVee neeks to addresr o.xt - :: "hese issues in ms 
resp' :">nse . r a i s e s two . ' \\-)ii^ i s s u e s f o r the c o u r t : 
Appe l l a iv was j ^ i i i H i t o coiite.r;r t h e c o u r t s f i n d i n g s i n 
*--]>* lower -'-•>'v- -, , : . f -s ^ r, 0.^ . - ,. . - .. •- - ; -^  1 <n:-i 
Judicial Administration, she is precluded from raising it on 
appeal. 
W'-.ere A.upo 1 1 anr .'ontest the factual findsnas 'he 
-, . . * . - . . i • . • . ; t 
:• ' :::'.is C^rt :i x ;ig.it mos'. favoiao't tu < ne lowt-r cc^i 
f; ridings a^d then establish "hat qi' en at : L'h^ cn f:n;mqs and 
couic not i , nd as J : d \ d. Appellant rid.; tailed r. marshal tne 
^v'dence - - :'^\ch a fashion, cuid therefore, her contest on those 
issues must fai 1 , 
2 
:KMINATIVE LAW 
Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
Intent: 
To esLai^.jh a uniform procedure for submitting written 
orders, judgments, and decrees to the -.- :-urr . This ru!** ;c; no* 
intended • • » •. 
written agr eements. 
Applicability: 
apply to all civil proceedings in courts of 
record exc^ot small claims. 
fit nit;,- : 
::. a 1.1 r u 1 i no s b v a ^ )u rt, counse 1 for t h^ pa rty or 
c* biioiter : _mcr ct^  t..^  L'UUI t iray clue; i : . » A.LJ. * .*_-* lourt ,t 
proposed order, iudam^nr lecree in "onformi1"^ * - *-^  * « •* 
. r • :. :... i c:c is 
sha] n - served upoi, opposing -"ounsi'. : -fore being presentee ! o 
the court * •• signature unlpp-* j~h^ rrur1 rt h-j-wise orders. "' * 
.A ".in' and counsel wit.^n 
i :.ve days arter service 
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STATKMEJNI 01 IPHE CAUK 
u i"nI-.11 in-: i "i in- mi mi mi mi«: in111 i" in I'":: 
This i s an appeal from the t r i a l c o u r t ' s findings and 
n i l i in ( ' - ' • * ::i ! 
properties. The pari iet, were nidiiimi u i v *4 and separated , n 
200J *.prellt±e Had previously been divorced ; n .1 hi 1 uirat er? 
pr< ' - i J » d •.; : * 
resu -: u* lie UL.GI a .voice, Appellee received a settlement 
properties which he sold, nertina ^nproxima^ely $253 000: ?":i^ 0,000 
The cour* -onciudei 'hat * he peach ta:r; property nad he^ -ii r^ >t 
separate and was Appe"1 lee T s premarital property The couit 
cl.i - i d e d .,:.-.... .;.. . I C S L : ;j equc'j - . y - a s s ig:n.,. h^ mar.: ai 
and business debt uo Appellee. Appellant was awarded C756 per 
month in cnnc • • 4 "*" ' e, • r> -
property was div.ca as uvjiccd between f i^ oai L J e.-.. <- i i,«_ r. and 
4 wheeler were the only properties ronteste-: ee truck v.. :__ :J 
Brd an the 4 wl ieel ei : it : J a i i: i:i e , 
PROCEEDINGS/DISPOSITION. A. _JURT 
The court took 2\i da1/:-: >>f test imo"-' and • •-.n- Luded r.he case on 
N < i > i } ernbe t: 28':-1 2 0 0 ] . ••. * 1 
i 
p r o p e r t i e s i n a c c o r d a n c e wi t l 1 s u b m i s s i o n s •-<• • i c e n s e d ?~rr- r i s e r s 
1
 . LaSa] IVIoi n i t a :i i i pi: opei : by a i id t l le p<_.; . .. :..-..*., • ..«. ^.n : i e s 
s L i p u l a t e d t o t h e v a l u e o f t h e home . From t h e s e v a l u a r i OILS t h e 
c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h e r e war " ! IP '*o >• v . i r i* .^ 1 a r r e t s -v:d 
i , . - •
 { , 
Q i s t r i b u t . o n m e p^.i .-n i ^ n v w n j c h i\ • ^ t e r n i n e d was p r e m a r i t a l , 
had b^p-n m - r . i n g l e d -md w i n c h lvf! • * ^ p r e c T a b ? y :i n c r e a s e d i n 
v . K .,- a c e a t 3 e t o 
: . i<inc^ e t f o r t s . y u e c o u r r r.oui; ; *-;at a : A i n c r e a s e i n v a l u e o f 
t h e p e a c h fa rm hr-r.! i v e n b a s e d u p o n m a r k e t f o r c e s . 
Li .>;->' . - : t 
o f t h e pen^ j i r a m i w; A p p e l l a n t . 
^wy ! >- * - n d ^ n F o^ M~,i r«ourt r e q a r d : : " . n r h e v a l u e s o i t h e 
- : . . „ . L -•:. . : ' .«.; \Jy-:ciCil Lei I ' l l d S 8 
premanta , asset, and from the concilia; or: cf the court that 
Appellee's income was $400'* ^ r moiiLl -.rpellant aopeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE PACTS 
Appellee, Brian Ballard (hereinafter Bri an) was divorced 
froiv ^ s " : - • - - •- ,•- -.,•-• : > 
l i i i e \),- , . .'. ** * . l . u i c a t e a p r o c e e d i n g
 ; i . -,.;'. A. i'>:;^ p r o p e r t y 
s e t t l e m e r : ' was c o n c l u d e d in 'Hay, lo:.'1.:. 
w e r e m a r r i e d OL, , u i y HI, , L ^ ; , . 
5 
r
- r i '*n .^' >! • i ' h e B i 1 • * '1'*\ ic ;<- WHO• M I : v, ^ i n e s ^ w i* h 
i r r i a n p u r c h a s e d t h e p r o p e r l y w m c n : u s i-r^-:: r e f e r r e d *o 
r "u s P.M1-r*-*r HC* + ^^ " p e a c h m r r r ' i^i^ ^ - - q . i s * 
1 
farm f o r :?JUL - . . w ; 
m a r i t a i p r o p e r t y p n o : t ; t ; u - u s e t t l e m e i / . i- < >? 
No, - - n r a i s a l h-id h e ^ r i-^ne o- t_h'- B;v r>1 n ' o i o e r r y ^ r " n e 
l i n e 8 ) . 
-, ., , r,« . . . ^ r i W ,, ^ •
i d ^ ; - : r , : ^ r ^ r e a q e was s o l d f o r 
l - r i a n p u t $"M0 - r e c e i v e d i i om m e Bar M t o w a r d s t h e 
f o r . . , . . . . .
 h . . . . . . ;*< 
TO . 1 5 . . J - 4 . c- 1 3 ; i). 2 0 3 , l i n e 2 i p . 2 0 6 , l i n e . 6 
,i i S x h i b i * r . 
1 
owec d i ' • . •• •. i i lie u . v o t c t •'-,}' t>4, j i r i t . E x h i b i t 
, .-.x-v,
 A, j.j.iie: 3 , t / . ^ . w 4 , J . i n e 4 ; p . 2 4 3 , l i n e 1 2 ; R . 1 6 5 ; 
r - . . 2) . 
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9. Valle Smouse appraised the peach farm at $278,000. 
(Exhibit 34; Tr.V.II,p.112,line 9). The value of the business 
property purchased from Eldon Ray was based upon the actual 
contract amount (Exhibit 6; Tr.V.I,p.68; p.72), the appraised 
book valuations (Exhibit 7; Tr.V.I,p.79,line 6; p.80,line 25) and 
the current appraisals of heavy equipment (Exhibit 7). 
10. Teague Eskelson appraised the LaSal Mountain property 
at $173,000. (Exhibit 11; Tr.V.I,p.106). 
11. Jamie's valuation of the LaSal property and peach farm 
Volume II, pages 200-203, and are her "estimations" of value, 
without having the expertise of the appraisers, but based upon 
her having a "real good feel for it". (Tr.V.II,p.200-203; 
p.261,lines 2-4). 
12. Brian testified that his income was $30,000 to $35,000 
per year (Tr.V.I,p.99) and in the current year he would earn 
approximately $30,000 (Tr.V.I,p.100,line 5). 
13. Brian submitted his tax returns for the years 1999, 
2000 and 2001 showing in 1999 he made $28,000 (Exhibit 12; 
Tr.V.I,p.148,line 22); in 2000, he made $40,000 (Exhibit 13; 
Tr.V.I,p.149,line 24) and in 2001 he made $28,000 (Exhibit 14; 
Tr.V.I,p.l50,line 13). 
14. Nate Knight, Brian's accountant, testified that he did 
Brian's bookkeeping and had numerically sequenced checks. 
(Tr.V.I,p.147,line 22) and none of the checks were missing. 
(Tr.V.I,p.187,line 9). 
7 
15. Jamie's former husband, Von Black, testified that he 
had been present with Jamie in several other court proceedings 
where Jamie testified that she was destitute and that Brian was 
not providing her with any income. She stated that she had no 
interest in or income from any business and did not have the 
means to sustain herself or put food on the table. 
(Tr.V.I,p.132,line 6). Jamie testified that Brian was not 
providing the financial means the family needed to live 
(Tr.V.I,p.132,line 19); that the children did not have the 
clothes they needed. Jamie testified that she had been forced to 
disconnect their telephone and couldn't meet her household 
obligations because of her financial circumstances. 
(Tr.V.I,p.133,line 1) 
16. Brian filed documents with the Utah Department of 
Business Regulation for the purpose of getting his bid limit as 
high as possible. Brian stated that those documents inflated the 
value of his property and the assets of his construction company 
and Grand Excavation to the licensing department. 
(Tr.V.I,p.84,line 18; p.85,line 19). 
17. Brian stated that the values of the assets which he 
placed on the application to the Department of Business 
Regulation was not based upon appraised valuations, but were 
based on estimates. (Tr.V.I,p.86,line 15). 
18. Brian received only sparing income from his excavation 
business. (Tr.V.I,p.76,1.8; p.77,line 5). 
8 
19. Brian provided a list of all of the jobs which he had 
done in 2001. (Exhibit 10). 
20. At the conclusion of the first day of trial, the judge 
met with counsel in chambers. The Court indicated that he 
believed that the farm property, originally 14 acres and now 
10.5, was premarital property, indicating that what Brian owned 
coming into the property was going to be treated as separate 
absent some substantial evidence of significant contribution on 
Jamie's part. Counsel were invited to provide case law. The 
Court considered the argument regarding this issue at the 
beginning of the second day of trial and while the Court did not 
rule at that time, the judge signaled counsel that there would 
have to be some significant or substantial evidence of 
contribution on Jamie's part. (Tr.V.II,p.5-13). 
21. Brian testified that Jamie had not done anything of 
significance to increase the value of the property. (Tr.V.I,p.9, 
line 4). 
22. Brian stated that Jamie did not help to build or 
remodel the fruit shed. (Tr.V.II,p.73,line 15). 
23. Brian stated that the property had not been improved 
since its purchase. (Tr.V.II,p.74,line 22). 
24 Brian stated, contrary to the assertion of Jamie, that 
the fruit trees had been purchased and put in prior to the 
marriage. (Tr.V.II,p.75,1.15-p.77,line 13; supporting Exhibit 
44) . 
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25. Jamie did not assist in putting in the trees 
(Tr.V.II,p.77,line 18); did not assist in selecting any of the 
trees for the property (Tr.V.II,p.77,line 20); and did not assist 
in caring for the property (Tr.V.II,p.77,line 23). 
26. Jamie's children, from a previous marriage who were 
ages 8 and 10, did not help plant trees or do work in the 
orchard, except in the year that he turned over the crop to them 
to pick and sell. (Tr.V.II,p.78,lines 7-25). 
27. No part of the orchard was ever in Jamie's name. 
(Tr.V.II,p.89,line 20). 
28. The taxes paid on the property were paid from the sale 
of lots which were part of the original 14-acre peach farm. 
(Tr.VII,p.74,line 9). 
29 Jamie indicated that she assisted in the orchard, which 
included pruning trees, taking water turns and going to seminars 
about the trees. (Tr.VII,p.192,line 23). 
30. On rebuttal, Brian testified that Jamie did no work in 
the orchard, stating "Jamie participated none in that orchard. I 
bought trees and planted them before I was married to her. Never 
has she done anything on the farm. She has never watered. She 
has never pruned. She has never weeded. She has never driven 
tractor. She has never done anything as far as work goes." 
(Tr.V.Ill,p.39,line 11). 
31. Brian testified that 14 00 trees were purchased around 
March 17, 1994, and were planted immediately. 
(Tr.V.Ill,p.40,line 11). 
10 
32. Jamie did not help plant the trees. 
(Tr.V.Ill,p.63,line 1). She never took a water turn, 
(Tr.V.Ill,p.64,line 8), he [Brian] took every water turn. 
(Tr.V.III,p.65,line 15). 
33. George Roberts, the Water Master, testified that he 
never saw Jamie take a water turn, (Tr.V.Ill,p.70,line 6) and 
that he never saw the kids working any water. 
(Tr.V.III,p.72,line 3). 
34. Tom Schellenberger testified that the price of raw 
ground is approximately doubled with property improvements and 
impact fees. (Tr.V.Ill,p.77,line 22). He also stated that the 
real estate market was flat. (Tr.V.Ill,p.85,line 17). 
35. Cole Noyes, a local contractor, testified that business 
was poor. (Tr.V.Ill,p.87). 
36. Brian testified that of the original 14 acres, 
approximately four acres had been sold off and the money placed 
into the construction of the parties' joint home and living 
expenses. (Tr.V.Ill,p.33,lines 24 - p.35). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court's valuation and division of the marital estate is 
considered against the highly deferential abuse of discretion 
standard. Parker v. Parker, 996 P.2d 565 %6, quoting Shepherd v. 
Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 433 (Ut.Ct.App. 1994); Lee v. Lee, 744 
P.2d 1378, 1380 (Ut.Ct.App. 1987). 
11 
Generally speaking, questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness. The trial court's factual findings are reviewed 
only if clearly erroneous. State v. Finlayson, 994 P. 2d 1243,116 
(Utah 2000) . 
Factual determinations are entitled to deference on appeal 
and not reversible absent clear error. Lysenko v. Sawaya, 7 P.3d 
783 fl5. 
An Appellate Court "will not reverse the findings of Fact of 
a trial court sitting without a jury unless they are against the 
clear weight of the evidence , thus making them clearly 
erroneous. (Dept. of Human Services ex rel Parker v. Irizarry, 
945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997). In the Shepherd case the court 
stated: 
" . . . The trial court has considerable latitude in 
adjusting financial and property interests, and its 
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity". 
Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Ut.Ct.App. 
1988); Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 430 (Ut.Ct. 
App.1994). 
"This Court will not disturb the trial court's decision 
[concerning property division] unless it is clearly 
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion". Shepherd id. 
at 433. 
And in the case of Elman v. Elman, 443 Utah Adv. Rpt.40,1[l7, 
45 P.3d 176, Hl7, the court noted: 
""A trial court has considerable discretion concerning 
property [division] in a divorce proceeding thus its 
actions enjoy a presumption of validity". Schaumberg v. 
Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Ut.Ct.App. 1994). We 
disturb a trial court's property division and valuation 
"only when there is a "misunderstanding or 
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misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion'"". 
Id. (quoting Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1269, 1373 (Utah 
1988)) . 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
RESPONDENTS ASSERTION THAT THE COURT'S FINDING ON THE 
PURCHASE PRICE OF THE FARM IS IN ERROR, MISCONSTRUES THE 
EVIDENCE AND IS IMPROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT BECAUSE IT WAS 
NOT RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
There is substantial evidence that the amount paid for the 
14-acre parcel of property was $300,000. That evidence included 
not only Brian's testimony, but also that of Jamie. Exhibit 1 
showed the proceeds from the sale of the property brought into 
the marriage, and both parties agreed $240,000 of those proceeds 
were applied to the purchase of the peach farm. Exhibit 5 
evidenced the additional amount borrowed for the purchase of the 
"peach farm". 
Jamie's assertion that the court made an incorrect finding 
is in error and is obvious in the material provided in Jamie's 
brief. A careful review of the findings (R.164, Ul3B)/ reveals 
that Brian originally paid $240,000 from premarital assets for 
the farm and water shares. That finding, when coupled with the 
actual statement of the court when it made its findings, shows 
without any doubt that the court understood exactly what the 
purchase price was of the "peach farm". At Transcript Volume 
III, page 146, line 1, the trial court states: 
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1. "With respect to the farm property, I have 
received good evidence which I believe that a 
significant portion of the profits realized by Mr. 
Ballard on the sale of his previous farm property 
can be traced directly to the purchase of, of the 
farm property, and uh, that amount is about 
$240,000.» 
The court then went on to address the value of that property 
and indicated that it had not appreciated during the marriage: 
"I believe that the present value of that property with 
portions, parcels carved out of it as sales have taken 
place from time to time, is about the same amount, 
perhaps a little higher.(Tr.V.III,p.146,line 7). 
The court spoke to the debts owed by the parties an4 
recognized that there was still owing approximately $63,000 
against the property (Exhibit 5). 
"The trust deed on the farm and that's awarded to Mr. 
Ballard, burdens the farm alone and that's awarded to 
Mr. Ballard and it's roughly the same amount as when 
the property was purchased, so that's not going to be 
treated as marital property." (Tr.V.Ill,p.149, line 
20(referring to Exhibit 5)). 
The court was not mistaken that the purchase price was 
$240,000 from premarital assets and $60,000 borrowed. 
The challenge on this finding was not preserved at the trial 
level. The general rule of appellate review requires 
contemporaneous objection or specific preservation for review on 
appeal. (Franklin v. Stevenson, 987 P.2d 22, if22 (Utah 1999)), 
the court quoted the case of State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 
(Utah 1987) In Franklin the issue was the admission of certain 
evidence that Stevenson failed to preserve by objection. It was 
necessary that the issue be preserved by specific objection. 
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Franklin quoted the case of Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198 
(Ut.Ap.App. 1989) where the court refused to address alleged 
error because there was no timely objection. The court stated: 
"We agree with the necessity for both specific 
preservation and timely objection before this court 
will address issues on appeal". 
In State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 81 (Utah 1983) the court 
stated: 
"This court has discretion to review the allegedly 
erroneous admission of evidence when the grounds of 
objection are not clearly or correctly stated. 
However, the rules do not state that we may review 
alleged errors when no objection at all is made at the 
trial level. See e.g. State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 
(Utah 1982). 
After the court had made its findings, including setting out 
the distribution of debt, the court invited the parties to 
indicate if there were any other items which needed to be covered 
or any other findings needed: 
"Now, is there something I've left out to this point, 
something you need me to make a finding about?" 
(Tr.V.III,p.l50, line 4). 
Jamie did not raise any objection or request additional findings. 
Jamie had yet another opportunity to object to the findings 
pursuant to JRuIe 4-504 (Tr.V.Ill,p.171,line 17). The final day 
of the trial was November 28, 2001. Mr. Halls was required to 
submit the proposed findings, conclusions and decree pursuant to 
-Rule 4-504 within 15 days of the hearing. Notice of Submission 
of the Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce, were sent to Mr. Black on December 6, 2001, within 
15 
the required time period. (R.148) No objections were raised by 
Mr. Black to any of the findings, in fact, no response was made 
at all. On January 2, 2002, a Notice to Submit was forwarded to 
the court indicating that no response had been received from Mr. 
Black and asking the court to enter the findings, conclusions and 
decree. (R.157) 
The court entered the findings, conclusions and decree on 
January 23, 2002, still with no response from Mr. Black. Rule 
4-504(2), states: 
"Notice of objection shall be submitted to the court 
and counsel within five days after service." 
The purpose of Rule 4-504 is to resolve these issues before 
orders are finalized. If no contemporaneous objection is made, 
no opportunity exists for the court to change or review its 
ruling. 
In the case of Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177,180 (Utah 1998) 
the State had objected to the words "reasonable cause" being used 
in the order where the actual wording had been "probable cause". 
The court stated: 
"Regardless of the language used during the hearing the 
language in the court's final written order controls 
and we will presume the order correct unless 
affirmatively shown otherwise. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 
93 5, 93 6. However the State does not assert, nor does 
the record indicate that the State objected in a timely 
manner to the written order's use of "reasonable 
cause'. Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration provides: "Copies of proposed findings, 
judgment and order shall be served upon opposing 
counsel before being presented to the court for 
signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of 
objection shall be submitted to the court and counsel 
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within five days after service. (Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration R.4-504(2). * Whether the district court 
erroneous referred to "probable cause1 during the 
hearing is immaterial because the State accepted the 
court's use of "reasonable cause' in the written order. 
Having failed to properly object the State waived its 
right to challenge the order in this regard on appeal. 
We, therefore, hold that the trial court used the 
correct reasonable cause standard in its final written 
order." 
Having failed to object to the court's findings when invited 
to at the time of the trial and having failed to object to the 
proposed findings of fact when submitted pursuant to Rule 4-
504(2), Jamie has failed to raise the issue in the lower bourt 
and has waived her right to challenge the findings on appeal. 
II. 
THE COURT HAD SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE FROM WHICH TO DETERMINE 
THAT THE PEACH FARM WAS SEPARATE PROPERTY AND THAT JAMIE WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO SHARE IN ANY APPRECIATION IN VALUE. 
This section of Jamie's brief assails the court's finding 
that the "peach farm" was Brian's separate property, but the 
argument in the body is really that Jamie is entitled to share in 
one-half of any increase in value because her efforts 
substantially enhanced or augmented an increase in value to the 
"peach farm". 
In Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2 304, 308 (Utah 1988), the 
Utah Supreme Court summarized the law with regard to premarital 
property and to property acquired during the marriage by one 
spouse through inheritance or gift. The court concluded that in 
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Utah, trial courts making equitable property divisions pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 should: 
" . . . generally award property acquired by one spouse 
by gift and inheritance during the marriage or property 
acquired in exchange thereof, to that spouse together 
with any appreciation or enhancement of its value, 
unless one of two conditions have occurred." 
These conditions are stated in the following quote: 
"We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making 
"equitable' property divisions, pursuant to §30-3-5 
should, in accordance with the rule prevailing in most 
other jurisdictions and with the division made in many 
of our own cases, generally award property acquired by 
one spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage 
(or property acquired in exchange thereof) to that 
spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement 
of its value, unless (1) the other spouse has by his or 
her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, 
maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby 
acquiring an equitable interest in it, Dubois v. 
Dubois, supra, or (2) the property has been consumed or 
its identity lost through co-mingling or exchanges or 
where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an 
interest therein to the other spouse. Cf. Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980) . An exception to 
this rule would be where part or all of the gift or 
inheritance is awarded to the nondonee or nonheir 
spouse in lieu of alimony as was done in Weaver v. 
Weaver, supra. The remaining property should be 
divided equitably between parties as in other divorce 
cases, but not necessarily with strict mathematical 
equality. Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106 (Utah 1986). 
Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her 
separate property and fifty percent of the marital property. In 
the 1994 case of Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 
(Ut.Ct.App. 1994), the court embraced the original principles set 
forth in Mortensen and the cases following wherein the Court 
said: 
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"Each party should, in general, receive the real and 
personal property he or she brought into the marriage 
or inherited during the marriage. Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 306 (Utah 1988) (quoting 
Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982); 
accord Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 263. This includes any 
appreciation of the separate property. Dunn v. Dunn, 
802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Ut.App.1990). Exceptions to this 
general rule include whether the property has been co-
mingled, whether the other spouse has by his or her 
efforts augmented, maintained, or protected the 
separate property, and whether the distribution 
achieves a fair, just and equitable result. Id. 
(citing Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1168 
(Ut.App.1190))." 
The nonowner spouse may gain an interest in the oth§r 
spouse's premarital property by contributing monetarily to it. 
In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Ut.App 1994), the 
Utah Court of Appeals, in agreement with Mortensen acknowledged 
that while the trial court has discretion to award inherited 
property in a divorce proceeding, the property, as well as its 
appreciated value, is generally regarded as separate from the 
marital estate and hence is left with the receiving spouse. 
In Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1997), the court 
rejected the husband's claim to a share of the appreciation in 
his wife's inherited property since the appreciation was due 
solely to market forces that occurred during the marriage. The 
increase was in no way due to the efforts or financial 
contribution of the husband. 
Jamie's argument III focuses on whether the property has 
been co-mingled and thereby become part of the marital estate. 
Here we focus on whether Jamie's efforts had contributed to the 
19 
enhancement, maintenance or protection of that property entitling 
her to share in any increase in equity. 
The court's findings on this issue are found in Transcript 
Volume III, pages 146-147. Exhibit 1 establishes that Brian 
received approximately $258,000 from the sale of the Bar M 
Chuckwagon and its accompanying property. There is no question 
that the Bar M was his sole property and that Jamie did not share 
in any appreciation in that property. The best determiner of the 
value of Brian's property from his prior marriage is what it 
actually sold for, not what Brian and Lenea decided between 
themselves what the value would be. The court found that the 
proceeds from the Bar M were traceable directly to the 14-acre 
"peach farm". (Tr.V.III, p.146, line 2) The court said that the 
present value of the property, referring to the appraisal of 
Valle Smouse (Exhibit 34), was approximately the same with the 
parcels carved out. (Tr.V.Ill,p.146, line 7). The Court stated 
that it had not heard any evidence that persuaded him, apparently 
referring to Jamie's testimony, that any contributions made by 
Jamie resulted in any enhancement to the value of the property. 
(Tr.V.Ill,p.146,line 11). There is no appreciable increase in 
value. 
On the disputed issue of how much effort Jamie put into the 
orchard, the court had testimony which included the document 
showing when the trees had been purchased and planted (Exhibit 
44) and the statements of George Roberts indicating he had never 
seen Jamie or her kids take a water turn, which were both 
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independent of either party, and weigh in favor of Brian 
(Tr.V.Ill,P.146,line 15). The court stated that he chose to 
weigh that testimony heavier, so in choosing between the two 
accounts, the court found that Brian's account as to how much 
effort Jamie put into the property, was more reasonable and 
believable. (Tr.V.Ill,p.146,line 21). 
The court referred to the appraiser's testimony where she 
had set the value of the property, not based upon the value of 
the orchard and trees which were there, but on the value of the 
property for development. The court found that any appreciation 
in the value of the property was due to market forces, not to the 
action of either of the parties. (Tr.V.Ill,p.147,line 2). The 
court stated that Jamie had not provided evidence that would 
persuade the court it would be inequitable to treat the peach 
farm as Brian's separate property. (Tr.V.Ill,p.147,line 5). 
Thereby, the court's determination was that Brian was entitled to 
his premarital property, together with any appreciation in value 
based upon market forces. 
A word about valuations. In Section II of Jamie's brief, 
she mischaracterizes the amount of equity that would have been 
available. Jamie wants to calculate the equity of the peach farm 
as the difference between the $112,000 value placed on the Bar M 
property by Brian and Lenea (Tr.V.I,p.26-27), and the purchase 
price of the peach farm (which Jamie incorrectly states here as 
$240,000). These are two completely separate properties. The 
best measure of the Bar M and accompanying property is what it 
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sold for seven month later, $258,000, rather than the value 
arbitrarily placed on the property by Brian and Lenae, without 
benefit of any appraisal. Certainly, Jamie was not entitled to 
any interest in equity or enhancement of the Bar M property. If 
any person had a claim that the Bar M was undervalued by Brian, 
it would have been Lenea, but she was a party to setting its 
value for the purpose of her divorce. 
Brian took $240,000 of the proceeds from the Bar M, and 
applied it to the purchase of the peach farm for $300,000 in 
1995. Brian sold three and one-half acres of the peach farm over 
the years, used proceeds to build the marital residence and he 
contributed the balance of those sales to marital expenses. 
Brian testified that the taxes on the peach farm were paid from 
the proceeds of the sale of the lots. (Trt.V.Ill,p.74, line 9). 
At the time of the divorce, an appraisal (Exhibit 34) placed 
the value of the peach farm at $280,000. Testimony indicated 
that the appraised value must be reduced by $28,000. (lot sold to 
Holyoak). This leaves the value of the peach farm at the time of 
the appraisal at $252,000, with $63,000 still left owing. During 
the marriage there were no improvements to the property which 
enhanced its value (Tr.V.II,p.24,line 22); any increase in value 
was due solely to market force. The 1400 trees were purchased 
and planted on the property prior to the time Brian bought it 
(Tr.V.111^.40,1.11) . 
The court in Elman v. Elman, 45 P. 3d 176,3211 (Ut .App. 2002) , 
stated that a spouse who seeks an interest in the other spouse's 
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business as a marital asset has a burden to establish the value 
of that business and its assets. [Citing Thomas v. Thomas, 987 
P.2d 603 (Ut.App.1999)]. The court also stated that a trial 
court can rely on one party's valuation evidence alone if the 
other party does not contradict it. Id. In Dunn, the court 
stated: 
"The marital estate should be valued as of the time of 
the divorce decree. (802 P.2d at 1320) 
And further, in Parker v. Parker, 996 P.2d 565,1111 
(Ut.Ct.App.2000), the court stated: 
"As a general rule the date the decree of divorce is 
entered is the appropriate valuation date. See Rappley 
v. Rappley, 855 P.2d 260, 262 (Ut.Ct.App. 1993). 
Generally, the marital estate is valued at the time of 
the divorce decree or trial. Accord Fletcher v. 
Fletcher, 815 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 (Utah 1980); Peck v. 
Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Ut.App.1987). However, the 
court has broad discretion in using a different date if 
circumstances warrant, such as one party acting 
obstructively, for instance, in hiding some asset. 
However, if the trial court uses dates other than the 
date of the divorce decree it must support its decision 
with sufficiently detailed findings to explain its 
deviation from the general rule." 
The court in this case had every reason to use the 
appraisals, not only because they were more reliable than the 
"guess" made by Jamie, but they were contemporaneous with the 
hearing of the divorce. 
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III. 
THE PEACH FARM PROPERTY WAS NOT CO-MINGLED AND 
HAS NOT LOST ITS IDENTITY AS SEPARATE PROPERTY. 
Jamie's third argument deals with the issue of whether the 
property was co-mingled or its identity so lost that it becomes 
marital property. 
The thrust of this argument is that the identity of the 
peach farm has been lost through co-mingling or exchanges, or the 
property has been consumed by the marriage or through gift. 
It is clear that there has been no gift or interest 
transferred to Jamie. The property was originally purchased with 
proceeds from Brian's prior marriage and no part of the 14 acres 
has ever been in Jamie's name except for the subdivided lot on 
which the marital residence sits. (Tr.V.II,p.89,line 20). From 
the original 14-acre piece, Brian testified that he transferred 
properties for the L.D.S. seminary building and others for 
building lots. 
Brian contributed the balance off the proceeds from the 
sales and those lots to the marriage. The money realized from 
the sales generated the income to pay the taxes on the peach farm 
and for the parties living expenses during periods of the 
marriage. Jamie received the benefit by sharing in the 
consumption of the sales proceeds. A portion of the proceeds 
were used to build the marital home, which Jamie also shared and 
was awarded in the divorce. (Tr.V.I,p.36, line 3). 
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The parties did not make any improvements of the remaining 
acreage. (Tr.V.II,p.74,line 22). There was no testimony or 
argument that there was substantial marital assets expended in 
any improvements. The taxes on the property were generated from 
trades or sales of the property itself, (Tr.V.II,p.74,line 9) and 
so no marital assets were expended in the payment of taxes. 
The basis of Jamie's claim is that because various parcels 
of the property were divided out and used to purchase the LaSal 
Mountain property, or were used to live off and build a home 
with, that the entire property should be considered to be co-
mingled. This is akin to the argument that if someone has an 
inheritance placed in the bank and from time to time they take 
$1000 and place it into the joint bank account, that the entire 
amount of inheritance becomes co-mingled. The only amounts which 
become co-mingled are the amounts applied to the use of the 
family. Those portions which the person has specifically shown 
a desire to contribute, share or apply to the marriage are the 
only portions co-mingled. Brian has not shown his desire to 
contribute the balance of the acreage which he purchased with 
premarital assets. Had he done so, he may have placed Jamie's 
name on the title to the entire property, which he did not do. 
Jamie has testified that she did extensive work on the fruit 
shed. Brian contested Jamie's claim that she worked on the fruit 
shed, stated she "did not assist in any way, shape or form". 
(Tr.V.II,p.73,line 15). It really makes no difference as the 
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fruit shed was sold or traded and the parties both enjoyed the 
proceeds. 
Jamie has failed to show that the parties used marital 
assets, other than the payment of some consumer debts from the 
sale of some of this property. The assertion that Brian intended 
the property to be contributed to the marital estate, because it 
was the marital financial basis was not born out by his retaining 
sole ownership of the property. 
Several of the assertions Jamie makes in her appeal are 
simply that, just assertions, and are not quoted to the record 
nor born out by the record. Even if they were born out by the 
record, the court has signaled that it did not trust her 
statements as much as it trusted or believed Brian's testimony. 
(Tr.V.II,p.146, line 18) and the court stated it was skeptical of 
what Jamie says because she would not respond to discovery. 
(Tr.Volume II, page 168, line 1). 
IV 
EQUITY DOES NOT DEMAND THAT JAMIE RECEIVE A 
DIVISION OF THE NON-MARITAL PROPERTY. 
When making an equitable order for property division upon 
divorce, the court should first catagorize the properties as 
being either part of the marital estate or the separate property 
of one of the parties. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 
(Ut.Ct.App 1999). Each party is presumed to be entitled to all 
of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital 
property. Then the court should consider the existence of 
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exceptional circumstances and if any be shown proceed to effect 
an equitable distribution in light of those circumstances. 
There is no question that courts, under the appropriate 
circumstances, have the ability to divide property, including 
premarital property, to make an equitable distribution. But 
there first must be an indication that the distribution is not 
equitable, such as where a party is unable to meet the 
obligations of child support or alimony. Absent inequity in the 
distribution of the marital estate it is within the court's 
discretion not to divide the property which was considered to be 
premarital. In Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, f26 
(Ut.Ct.App. 1999), the court stated: 
"Generally, in a divorce proceeding "each party is 
presumed to be entitled to all his or her separate 
property and fifty percent of the marital property1. 
Citation omitted. This presumptive rule of thumb does 
not supercede the trial court's broad equitable power 
to distribute the marital property regardless of who 
holds title. (See Finlayson, 874 P.2d 849) . . . the 
trial court may in the exercise of its broad 
discretion, divide the property equitably regardless of 
its source or time of acquisition. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 
at 1146. (There is no fixed formula upon which to 
determine a division of property in a divorce action). 
A trial court may elect to distribute marital property 
unequally when the circumstances of the parties dictate 
a departure from the general rule (e.g. to enable one 
party to fulfill an alimony or child support 
obligation). See Thomas, 375 Utah Ad. Rpt. at 25; 986 
P.2d at 609; see also Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 
(Utah 1987), [holding trial court should be guided by 
general purposes of property division which is to 
allocate the property in a manner which best serves the 
needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue 
their separate lives; Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 
1276, 1279, Note 1 (Utah 1987)]." (Emphasis added). 
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The general rule is that the parties who brought the 
property into the marriage receive that property. Equity will 
require that each party retain the separate property they brought 
into the marriage (Watson v. Watson, 83 7 P.2d 1, 5 (Ut.App. 
1992). Only in exceptional circumstances where there is an 
indication that division of marital property would be 
inequitable, may the court look to premarital properties to make 
the division equitable. There is no inequity in our 
circumstance. 
If this Court looks to the division made by the trial court 
it will see that Jamie has received an equitable distribution of 
marital property. The court assigned all of the debt, which was 
extensive, to Brian. It then determined that there was $318,000 
in marital assets, of which Jamie was entitled to half -
$159,000. The court then awarded $60,000 equity in the home to 
Jamie, with Brian making the house payment, and indicated that 
Jamie was entitled to another $99,000 in liquid assets. Brian 
offered another $11,000 if Jamie would not insist on a division 
of the LaSal Mountain property; Jamie accepted. Jamie was 
awarded a marriage settlement of $110,000 to be paid within 18 
months and $60,000 equity in the home, thus receiving $170,000 in 
total assets and no debt. (Tr.V.Ill,p.155-6). 
The court went through the process of determining Jamie's 
needs for the operation of her home, making special note of the 
fact she had no house payment. After establishing what her 
reasonable expenses were, the court concluded that Jamie needed 
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$1250 per month in order to operate her household, 
(Tr.V.III,p.168,1.4). Jamie was awarded $756 per month in child 
support and $750 per month in alimony. 
Brian received all of the debt of the parties, 
(Tr.V.III,p.155,line 20) and the court divided the balance of the 
marital property in what it stated was a perfectly equal division 
or as close to that as possible. (Tr.VIII,p.155,line 25) 
Jamie was awarded equity in the home and cash payments 
totaling $170,000, received $1506 in child support and alimony, 
is living in a house less than five years old and has no marital 
debt to pay off. There must be some showing on Jamie's part that 
this is inequitable above and beyond just disagreeing with the 
decision that the peach farm was premarital property. The cases 
quoted in Jamie's brief simply indicate that the court has 
discretion to make distributions of premarital property where it 
cannot make an equitable distribution otherwise. The evidence is 
strong that the court considered the equities and divided the 
property equally. There is no showing that the distribution was 
not equitable. 
The thrust of Jamie's argument is that the court did not 
take into consideration the appropriate values for the peach 
farm. The value of the peach farm does not come into 
consideration unless the court determines that it cannot 
equitably divide the marital property, and then must make some 
distribution of the non-marital property. That is not the 
position the court found itself in. 
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V. 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT BRIAN 
MADE $4000 PER MONTH. 
Brian testified that his income was between $30,000 and 
$35,000 (Tr.V.I,p.99;p.100,line 5). To support this allegation, 
Brian provided documentation showing all of the work he had in 
2001 (Exhibit 10). John Huff, a contractor in the Moab area 
testified that work in that area was slow; that he had stayed 
busy in the first year, but in the second year and every year 
since, had been going downhill and it was tough to make avliving. 
He stated that it was difficult for him to work 4 0 hours per 
week. Mr. Huff stated that he had tried to get jobs by 
advertising, soliciting and had submitted many bids, but was 
unable to secure jobs or steady employment. (Tr.V.III,p.127-128). 
Nate Knight, Brian's accountant, provided documentation 
taken from bookkeeping and tax preparation records which showed 
that Brian made $28,000 in 1999, $40,000 in 2000, and $28,000 in 
2001. (Tr.V.I,p.148,line 22 - p.150). 
Tom Schellenberger, a real estate agent and developer in the 
Moab area, testified that the real estate market was flat. 
(Tr.VIII,p.85, line 17). 
Von Black testified that in his recent court proceedings 
with Jamie, she has testified that the family was destitute, that 
she received no income from any business and that Brian was 
unable to provide adequately for the family and did not provide a 
living wage. (Tr.V.I,p.131-132). 
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The court found that Brian did not provide $8,000 to $10,000 
per month to operate the household as Jamie had alleged 
(Tr.V.III,p.163,line 5) and established her needed household 
expense at $1250/mo. (Tr.V. Ill P. 168). The court found that 
her presentation on the subject of his income had been 
inconsistent and that she had consistently in other proceedings 
expressed complaints about the lifestyle she and Brian had and 
his inability to provide for the family. This testimony was 
inconsistent with Jamie's assertions that Brian had made $80,000 
to $100,000 per year. (Tr.V.Ill,p.163, line 10). 
The court found that it was hampered in its determination by 
the absence of tax returns, but that this was at least partly 
Jamie's responsibility as well because she had not complained 
about the failure to file tax returns in the past and has 
benefitted as well as Brian. (Tr.V.Ill,p.163, line 24; p.164, 
line 3).. 
The court made the statement that the only solid evidence 
established Brian's income at $4,000 per month. (Tr.V.Ill,p.164, 
line 4; Exhibits 12, 13, 14, 25 and 26). 
Jamie has simply failed to show any evidence whatsoever of 
Brian's income. Jamie's presentation focused on Brian's values 
submitted to the Department of Business Licensing to establish 
bid limitations. This was not "income" evidence, it is asset 
related. The only evidence Jamie presents to establish her claim 
that the court made an erroneous finding is her estimation of 
what the family's expenses were, again referring back to her 
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assertion that she needed $8000 to run the household, a claim 
which she was unable to support with documentation. 
The court had substantial evidence to determine that Brian's 
income was around $4000 and only Jamie's unsupported assertions 
of family expenses to indicate that this was not correct. 
The court made an appropriate finding based upon the 
substantial weight of the evidence. 
VI 
RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE AND THEN 
ESTABLISH THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN" 
MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT IN THIS PROCEEDING• 
A party who seeks to overturn the factual decisions of a 
court has the responsibility of marshaling the evidence. The 
court stated in Utah Med. Prods, v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228,232 
(Utah 1998): 
"After marshaling all of the evidence in support of the 
trial court's ruling, the appellant must demonstrate 
that even in the light most favorable to the trial 
court, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings. Reed v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 
176 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1980). We apply this 
deferential standard to trial courts because of their 
advantaged position to evaluate the evidence and 
determine the facts. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 
230 (Utah 1997); see also Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 52a. If the challenger fails to meet 
this burden its claim must fail." 
In setting forth the standard of review in the case of State 
v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Utah 1997), the court stated: 
"Before this court Robertson essentially challenges the 
trial court's finding of fact. Therefore Robertson 
bears the burden of marshaling all of the evidence in 
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favor of the factual findings that he was malingering 
then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the court below, the evidence 
is insufficient to support the court's finding." 
Additionally, in the case of Whitear v. Labor Commission, 
973 P.2d 982, 985 (Ut.Ct. App. 1998), the court stated: 
"When a party fails to marshal the evidence, we assume 
the record supports the commission's findings. See 
Intermountain Health Care v. Industrial Comm'n, 83 9 
P.2d 841, 844 (Ut.Ct.App. 1992). We have shown no 
reluctance to affirm when the petitioner ha sfailed to 
meet its marshaling burden. See e.g. Turnbaugh v. 
Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 944 (Ut.Ct.App. 1990). 
Jamie has supported her position by reference to the record 
on those issues which she contests, but has failed to set forth 
all of the facts and especially those most favorable to the 
court's findings below and then show why the court could not find 
as it did. Failing to marshal the evidence and demonstrate to 
this court why the findings are insufficient when viewed most 
favorable to the court's findings, her claims must fail. Brian 
has provided numerous references to the record setting forth the 
facts which support the court's findings. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth above, Jamie has failed to 
demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in any way in 
reaching its conclusions. She has failed to establish that the 
decision of the court was inequitable or that the findings were 
erroneous. 
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The other issues raised in her appeal with regard to the 
court's findings were not raised at the trial court level and 
were not raised pursuant to JRule 4-504, and are, therefore, 
barred on appeal. 
Jamie has failed to marshal the evidence to establish that 
the court's findings were inadequate. 
Having failed in all regards, her appeal must fail. The 
findings and ruling of the district court should be upheld. 
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